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Cheung: Greed, a Forgotten Vice?

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
Is the notion of greed popular in today’s world? The answer is straightforwardly
yes. Here is a recent example. Daraprim is a drug approved by the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) in 1953. It has been used to treat toxoplasmosis, a parasite
infection which is life-threatening to babies born to infected women during
pregnancy, as well as to people with compromised immune systems. As of early
2015, this drug was selling at $13.50 per tablet. Shortly after the start-up company
Turing Pharmaceuticals acquired the drug in August, its CEO Martin Shkreli
decided to raise the price to $750 per tablet.1 In subsequent interviews, Shkreli
promised to reduce the price and claimed that the income would be used to
develop better treatments for toxoplasmosis: “I can see how it looks greedy, but I
think there’s a lot of altruistic properties to it.”2 This remark did not find much
sympathy from the public. Strong reaction came within two days of the New York
Times’ report on Shkreli. BBC News suggested that Shkreli is “the most hated
man in America.” 3 The Washington Post called him “[a] new icon of modern
greed” and ridiculed his choice of the word “altruistic.”4
Greed is not just found in individuals; it is also systemic. The banking
crisis in 2008 showed that “the present system relies on motives of greed and
acquisitiveness,” claimed political economist Robert Skidelsky and his son
philosopher Edward Skidelsky.5 Government officials also are not shy to admit
that greed is a problem. Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve during 1987-2006, said to the Senate Banking Committee that “by the
1

Andrew Pollack, "Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight," The New York Times,
September 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-ina-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?_r=1.
2
Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Ceo Martin Shkreli: 4,000 Percent Drug Price Hike Is 'Altruistic,' Not
Greedy," The Washington Post, September 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/toyour-health/wp/2015/09/22/turing-ceo-martin-shkreli-explains-that-4000-percent-drug-price-hikeis-altruistic-not-greedy/.
3
BBC, "Who Is Martin Shkreli - 'the Most Hated Man in America'?," BBC, September 23, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34331761, which was concurred by Forbes a month
later. Matthew Herper, "Martin Shkreli Won't Suffer Because of That $1-a-Pill Competitor. Here's
Why," Forbes, October 23, 2015,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/10/23/suckers-that-1-a-pill-competitor-wonthurt-martin-shkreli-one-bit/.
4
Janell Ross, "Martin Shkreli: A New Icon of Modern Greed," The Washington Post, September
23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/09/23/martin-shkreli-a-newicon-of-modern-greed/?tid=sm_fb.
5
Robert Skidelsky and Edward Skidelsky, How Much Is Enough? Money and the Good Life (New
York, NY: Other Press, 2012), 5.
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late 1990s the American corporate culture had become corrupt as regulatory
mechanisms were ‘overwhelmed’ by the proliferation of ‘avenues to express
greed [that] had grown so enormously.’”6 In 2012 the then British Chancellor of
Exchequer, Rt. Hon George Osborne, publicly stated that “in the years ‘2005,
2006, and early 2007, [there was] evidence of systematic greed at the expense of
financial integrity and stability’ and that the mischief of key players in London’s
financial sector had ‘elevated greed above all other concerns and brought our
economy to its knees.’”7 In 2013, Mark Carney, a former Governor of the Bank of
Canada, “publicly criticized the international banking community for failing to
safeguard society’s economic machinery from the personal voracity of its
entrusted administrators: ‘These abuses have reinforced questions about the
fundamental values of people in the system.’”8
Whether the above statements about greed are entirely accurate or not,
there is no doubt that people understand them, and many accept them. With all
these and many other cases in recent decades, it seems reasonable to presume that
people are concerned about greed in business and combating greed would be one
of the major foci of business ethics. After all, discourse on American business
ethics is fueled by so many scholars from Catholic or Protestant universities.9
Avarice, or greed, is condemned in the Christian Bible as “the root of all evil,”10 a
point Pope Francis reiterated recently, 11 and it is regarded in the Christian
tradition as one of the seven deadly sins. Therefore, it is expected that greed
would be under heavy fire in business ethics.

Greenspan’s testimony regarding the Federal Reserve Board’s Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress, given before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, July
16, 2002. Cited in Mark Slatter, "The Secret Life of Greed," Anglican Theological Review 96, no.
3 (2014), 482.
7
Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt. Hon George Osborne, Mp, on FSA
Investigation into Libor, by George Osborne (2012). cited in Slatter, 482.
8
Mark Carney, speech at the Cardus Speaking Series given at the Toronto Region Board of Trade,
May 3, 2013, as cited in Slatter, 482.
9
To be sure, many other religious or philosophical traditions like Islam, Confucianism and
Buddhism also would like to warn against greed. However, I am describing the phenomenon in the
US where those religions are not prominent.
10
“For the love of money is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred
from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows.” 1 Timothy 6:10. And in the
Ten Commandments there is this one: “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not
covet thy neighbour’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor
any thing that is thy neighbour’s.” Exodus 20:17. KJV Bible.
11
"The Power of Money," L'Osservatore Romano, 25 September 2013, 2013, Weekly ed.,
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/cotidie/2013/documents/papa-francescocotidie_20130920_power-money.html.
6
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However, most textbooks on business ethics do not even mention greed,
let alone take it seriously. Sometimes greed even comes across as complimentary,
because greed is widely understood as the necessary driving force for capitalism.
Could this be the reason why there is so little concern about greed? As economist
John Maynard Keynes believed, the motivational basis of capitalism was “an
intense appeal to the money-making and money-loving instincts of individuals.”12
Eventually, that leads to the popular belief that "greed is good," as exemplified by
people like Ivan Boesky and the fictional icon Gordon Gekko. In popular writings,
greed becomes indistinguishable from self-interest and the consuming desire of
the former is justified by the pursuit of the latter. 13 However, a moment of
reflection suggests that this view of greed as a virtue in capitalism, even if it may
be true, cannot explain the absence of discussion of greed in the field of business
ethics. One would expect that the discrepancy between the popular negative view
that the business world is full of greedy people running amok and the positive
view that greed is a virtue in capitalism would generate a lot of debates. Such
debates are, however, absent in the literature.
It is within this context that I investigate the idea of greed in this paper.
The aim and scope of this paper is preliminary. The aim is to propose an
integrated concept of greed that is relevant and useful in the contemporary world
in which business and capitalism are ubiquitous. In Section 2, I examine some
notions of greed from popular understanding and from the literatures of business
ethics and humanities in general. Then in Section 3 I focus both on the Christian
notion of avarice as listed among the seven deadly sins, and the more Aristotelian
notion of greed, namely pleonexia. The latter notion is absent in the literature of
business ethics but still alive in the philosophy literature of Aristotelian studies. In
Section 4, I propose my own integrative understanding of greed and situate it in
our contemporary business world. Throughout these sections, the approach I take
is reflective equilibrium.14 I start with examining some popular notions and try to

12

John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuaion, the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, 9
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 293. cited in Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 7.
13
For example, Robert Pagliarini, "Greed Is Good: Why You Need to Tap into Your Inner Gordon
Gekko," CBS News, last modified Jun 2, 2011, accessed July 25, 2018.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/greed-is-good-why-you-need-to-tap-into-your-inner-gordongekko/.
14
“The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our considered
judgments… about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern
them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered
judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to
achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The method succeeds and we achieve reflective
equilibrium when we arrive at an acceptable coherence among these beliefs.” Norman Daniels,
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refine them. Then I identify some explanatory difficulties and thus look for other
notions to enrich the original ones. Through back and forth considered judgments,
I wish to come to a fuller formulation with more explanatory power of the concept
of greed.15
The scope of this paper is preliminary in the sense that this paper only
attempts to explicate greed, in hope of laying the foundation for more intelligible
discussions of greed in the contemporary business world. This paper, however,
remains non-committal on whether greed is a necessary evil to fuel capitalism. It
could be helpful to motivate this paper by highlighting the surprising lack of
discourse on greed in the field of business ethics with a survey on popular
textbooks. However, since this paper is philosophical in nature, I place the survey
results, which are lengthy, in the Appendix. Lastly, I am aware of a number of
recent empirical psychological studies on greed.16 This paper, however, is focused
on philosophical explication and therefore those studies fall outside the scope of
the current investigation.
SECTION 2: POPULAR UNDERSTANDING OF GREED
2.1. A Consuming and Acquisitive Desire
Greed is commonly referred to by most people as the desire to have more and
more. Two components can be identified here. There is a desire, and it is
consuming, so much so that it renders a person restless until the desire is fulfilled
and in at least some cases that desire may never be completely fulfilled. In their
article in Scientific American Mind, Ariely, Grüneisen and Ritter see greed as “[a]
consuming desire for wealth or affluence, causing one to think of little else.”17
"Reflective Equilibrium," The Metaphysics Research Lab, last modified Oct 14, 2016, accessed
Mar 29, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/.
15

This is different from some other approaches like stating a definite and sophisticated
claim or definition early on and proceeding to prove or disprove it in the rest of the paper.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for asking me to clarify this so that the
organization of this paper is now clearer.
16

For example, S.W. Gilliland and J. Anderson, "Perceptions of Greed: A Distributive Justice
Model," in Emerging Perspectives on Organizational Justice and Ethics, ed. S.W Gilliland, D.D.
Steiner, and D.P Skarlicki (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2011); G. Krekels and M.
Pandelaere, "Dispositional Greed," Personality and Individual Differences 74 (2015)., T.G.
Seuntjens et al., "Defining Greed," British Journal of Psychology 106 (2015); T.G. Seuntjens et al.,
"Dispositional Greed," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 108 (2015); Long Wang and
J. Keith Murnighan, "On Greed," The Academy of Management Annals 5, no. 1 (2011).
17
Dan Ariely, Aline Grüneisen, and John Ritter, "The Prie of Greed," Scientific American Mind,
2013., 794.
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They liken this to gluttony, with its craving for delicacies. Whether the food
addresses your hunger or nutritional needs does not matter. Rather, it is the
satisfaction of a consuming desire that matters. Likewise, whether the acquired
wealth addresses your material needs does not matter. It is the satisfaction of the
desire to acquire that does. Philosopher Peter Singer, in analyzing what people are
really seeking in the pursuit of money, notices something similar. In the new style
of business executives of his time, there is an obsession for competition and
winning such that a supreme winner will gain little satisfaction from winning.18
As the sailing boat racer Stuart Walker writes, “Winning doesn’t satisfy us - we
need to do it again, and again… We are addicted.”19
However, I doubt whether having a consuming desire is sufficient for
being greedy. The consuming desire of a greedy person should be qualified as
having to do with acquiring more of the same thing or something else. Imagine a
person, let’s call her Jane, who dreams of owning a luxurious sports car and over
two years has been working very hard for that goal. She drastically changes her
financial plan and lifestyle to make the necessary amount of money toward the car.
Jane qualifies as having a consuming desire here. However, we ordinarily would
not characterize Jane as greedy. Usually, it is when Jane follows a consuming
desire to buy another sports car, still another sports car, etc., then we begin to
think that “Jane is greedy” has become an appropriate characterization. Here we
should also note that nowadays we had better expand the range of objects of the
desire in greed. It is not just about material possession. As Susan Long aptly puts
it, in twenty-first century corporate life, “the idea of avarice is also associated
with a greed for power: to be in that place that leads to gaining mass recognition,
and the lifestyle of the rich and famous; the sometimes perverse culture of

18

Peter Singer, How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (Amherst, New York:
Prometheus Books, 1995), 204-05.
19
Cited in ibid., 205.
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celebrity."20 She also suggests that a corporation as an organizational system can
be greedy as well.21
From now on I would call this the popular idea of greed, i.e., a consuming
desire to acquire more and more of the same things or something different. The
object of desire could be money, material possession, status, power, etc. Note that
there are two conditions: it cannot be just about having a desire that is consuming,
but the desire also has to be one that is to acquire more and more. By calling this
“popular” I do not mean that it is incorrect or not sophisticated enough. It is
simply a view held by a lot of people. Through the reflective equilibrium
deliberation process in Sections 3 and 4 I will explain that this view should be
complemented with two other ideas.
2.2. Abstract Greed
In the field of business ethics, the discussion closest to that of greed may be the
one offered by a famous business ethicist, Robert Solomon. He has written on
something called an abstract greed, in his title in the Ruffin series, Ethics and
Excellence, where he devotes a whole chapter on “Abstract Greed.”22 Solomon
describes an experiment he usually does in his classes, where many students claim
to expect to make enormous sums of money such that they have no idea how to
get that kind of money and they even lack the sense about what to do with it.
Solomon claims that it is not even money but the sheer numbers themselves that
count in those people’s minds.23 “In abstract greed it is money, pure wealth, that
is wanted.” 24 Thus he would rather give the name “abstract greed” to this
20

Susan Long, "Greed," Psychodynamic Practice 15, no. 3 (2009), 248. A reviewer suggested that
the desire for fame or status may be more normally associated with the vices of envy and pride.
This is understandable. However, as I will explain in Section 3.2 below, according to Curzer, it is
possible for one behavior to involve more than one virtue or vice but Aristotle’s ascription of
virtue or vice is based on behavior-under-a-description, which includes the psychology of the
person in question. For example, one may pursue status with different motives. The motive of
boasting oneself would normally relate to the vice of pride. The motive of competitive acquisition
would normally relate to the vice of greed. We can give a similar analysis for envy, but admittedly
envy seems closer to greed. Indeed, as what I will explain in Section 3.1, Taylor thinks that envy
is structurally similar to greed. I defer the more detailed discussion of envy to that section.
21
Ibid., 254. This involves collective responsibility and is related to the business ethics debate
about whether a corporation can be held morally responsible for its decisions. Those are important
topics but beyond the scope of this paper.
22
Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992).
23
Ibid., 34-35.
24
Robert C. Solomon, A Better Way to Think About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to
Corporate Success (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36.
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phenomenon, which is “greed without desire,” “greed without lust, greed learned
but not comprehended.”25 Since it is not a desire at all, Solomon says it “isn’t
even greed.”26 It only plays “an artificial and distracting and destructive role in
our ambitions.”27
Solomon’s conceptualization is problematic in a number of ways. First of
all, the name “abstract greed” is unnecessarily confusing. He first seems to imply
that abstract greed is a special kind of greed, but then he reiterates that it is not
greed at all. Second, whereas I agree that beyond a certain amount of profit or
material possessions, money or any other acquired item would easily become a
mere number or an abstract idea,28 the refusal to call such a phenomenon as greed
seems superfluous and psychologically unreasonable. Right in the same paragraph,
Solomon admits that “no motive floats alone” and the abstract greed of his
students is
obviously tied to all sorts of natural desires, especially the desire
for the approval of their peers.... They want to fit the images
provided by the media, and these are too often dressed in the
glamour of wealth…. It is the desire to achieve those dubious
virtues that too many business executives, unthinkingly parroting
the conventional ‘wisdom’ of the times and their speech-writers,
declare again and again to be the driving forces of American
society.29
Apparently Solomon presumes that the reference of the word “desire” ought to be
some kind of mental attitudes that are natural, which most likely suggests whose
objects are “natural,” e.g., delicacies, luxurious sports cars, enormous mansions,
etc., and the amount has to be what one can comprehend and it has to be
practically attainable. However, why is this presumption reasonable? A
consuming mental attitude to acquire more and more unrealistic things, physical
or mental, “natural” or not, is still a desire. In common usage of the word “greedy,”
we do ordinarily refer to a person as greedy when that person has a consuming
25

Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 36.
27
Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business, 36.
28
Here one may easily recall the happiness studies that show that an average American’s day-today happiness is not going to increase when he or she makes money beyond $75,000 per year.
Nikki Waller, "Magic Number for Happiness: $75,000 a Year," Wall Street Journal, Sept 12, 2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703467404575486310348815640.
Daniel
Kahneman and Angus Deaton, "High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional
Well-Being," Proceedings of the National Academy of sciences 107, no. 38 (2010).
29
Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business, 37.
26
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desire to acquire more and more, even beyond her comprehension, as in those
examples I mentioned in the previous section.30
More importantly, just how can a mental attitude that wants money or pure
wealth “as a goal given and unquestioned”31 fail to be a desire? Isn’t that want a
desire? Furthermore, this alleged non-desire is supposed by Solomon to be closely
tied to, and have the ability to motivate, numerous desires that are so strong that
they drive the whole American society to the same greedy mindset. Why is a
motivating mental attitude not a desire? If it is still a desire, why couldn’t we
simply call that desire greed? We find no reason to conceptualize an abstract
greed as different from greed. I suggest what Solomon refers to with the term
“abstract greed” is simply greed.32
2.3. Greed and Its Corresponding Virtues
It may be helpful to understand greed better by identifying the corresponding
virtue(s) to greed. Plato thinks of a virtue and a vice in an opposite relation,
whereas Aristotle thinks a virtue has two corresponding vices, one of excess and
one of defect.33 Let us start with Plato’s approach. What is the opposite of greed?
Given that greed involves a consuming desire to acquire more and more, its
opposite could be whatever virtue that recommends against such desire or at least
against its consuming nature. Virtues like thrift and contentment34 are probably
the best candidates. These two virtues are unfortunately almost non-existent in the
business ethics literature. In the only textbook that mentions thrift, the Scout
I suspect Solomon had in mind Aristotle’s distinction between acquisition of the natural forms
and unnatural forms of wealth. However, that still does not explain why the acquisition of
unnatural forms of wealth cannot be a desire that we nowadays would like to call greed.
31
Solomon, A Better Way to Think About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate
Success, 36.
32
Speaking of Solomon’s idea that abstract greed is a special case of greed (or not greed at all), it
is surprising to note that Solomon has not discussed the more common idea of greed at all before
or after his analysis of abstract greed. Does he think that there is no such thing as that kind of
greed? What exactly would that kind of greed be to him? Is that kind of greed something too
trivial compared to abstract greed? Why a discussion of abstract greed is needed in a book on
business ethics but a discussion of that kind of greed is not needed? I am not going to investigate
these questions, which are not directly related to the thesis of this paper, but I would like to flag
this here to reiterate my observation that there is a surprising lack of attention to greed in
contemporary business ethics literature.
33
Charles M. Young, "Aristotle on Temperance," The Philosophical Review 97, no. 4 (1988): 234,
41.
34
Being content with what one has. Solomon lists contentment as a virtue in A Better Way to
Think About Business. The basic concern of contentment is happiness and peace of mind in
situations of seemingly unlimited temptation and opportunities. Solomon, A Better Way to Think
About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success, 80-81.
30
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handbook reportedly claims that a thrifty scout “works to pay his way and to help
others.” “He saves for the future. He protects and conserves natural resources. He
carefully uses time and property.”35 Presumably such a person would not amass
so much material that he could not make good use of it.36
Contentment is quite obviously the opposite of greed. 37 When one is
content with what one already has, one is no longer consumed by the urge to
acquire more. The desire to have more and more is simply absent. This person
may still acquire things from time to time but the acquisition is not conducted out
of a consuming desire.38
What about the virtue in an Aristotelian framework? Since it seems to
have something to do with controlling our desires, we may be tempted to think
that temperance is the corresponding virtue. Indeed that is a popular take. For one,
Deirdre N. McCloskey, a professor of economics, history, English and
communication, has made just that kind of claim. She describes herself as an
Aristotelian and Aquinian. 39 When identifying and celebrating the bourgeois
virtues in capitalism, she argues that being rich and having a lot of material
possession is not in itself necessarily a moral mistake. Such moral mistake is
characterized as intemperance.
… having a lot is not immoral…. So we often buy things that turn
out to be not worth the price. When we mistake in the other direction
we do not buy, and wait for the dust removers to come down in
price…. Being rich in electrostatic dust removers and the like is not
sinful… It is not always a sign of intemperance. It is merely a sign of
capitalism’s very great and productive prudence.4041

35

Joseph DesJardins and John J. McCall, Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics, 4th ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000), 25.
36
A more contemporary notion of thrift could be sustainability.
37
Though there seems hardly any Western philosophical discussion on this, Buddhism’s basic
teaching, as in the Four Noble Truths, is directly related to contentment.
38
Solomon offers a brief discussion of contentment in his catalog of forty five business virtues in
A Better Way to Think About Business. However, though he is thinking in terms of the Aristotelian
means, he does not realize greed could be one of the corresponding vices of contentment. Solomon,
A Better Way to Think About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success, 80-81.
39
Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006),
453.
40
Ibid., 453-454.
41
As I will explain later in this paper, roughly speaking, taking things unjustly from the poor is
greed in Aristotle’s eyes. However, McCloskey here does not seem to be aware of this connection.
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This does not imply that McCloskey is all for material acquisition. She is simply
suggesting that the market itself is not inherently bad. She then moves on to talk
about thrift. She firmly believes that thriftiness is a virtue in Christianity.42
From the above it is clear McCloskey thinks that greed is the
corresponding vice of thriftiness, and thriftiness is a form of temperance.
However, a virtue comes with two vices according to Aristotle. The two
extremes/vices in the same sphere of temperance are already stated by Aristotle as
self-indulgence and insensibility, according to Book III of Nicomachean Ethics.
So, is greed self-indulgence or insensibility? Definitely not about insensitivity to
bodily pleasure, greed has to be then identified as self-indulgence. Therefore, we
can now see that McCloskey’s overall reasoning is that a self-indulgent person
would give herself to desires, one of which is the desire for more and more money,
which is greed.
That is a convenient way to locate greed in the tri-relational structure of
Aristotle’s understanding of virtues and vices. However, a deeper look at
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics may require us to reject views like McCloskey’s.
Both Charles M. Young and Howard J. Curzer43 point us to the following claim of
Aristotle’s.
Men who are concerned with [the pleasures of honor or learning]
are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent. Nor, again, are
those who are concerned with other pleasures that are not bodily;
for those who are fond of hearing and telling stories and who spend
their days on anything that turns up are called gossips, but not selfindulgent, nor are those who are pained at the loss of money or of
friends. (1117b31-1118a1)
According to Young, Aristotle distinguishes between the pleasures of the body
and the pleasures of the soul. Temperance has to do with the former only.
Furthermore, profligacy, and therefore temperance as well, is restricted to animal
pleasures that derive from the sense of touch (1118b1-4). That is why the topic of

42

McCloskey, 455. But then she thinks she has to face the paradox of thrift, which suggests that
with more thrifty people and with fewer spendthrifts, economic growth will slow down and
therefore we will all end up doing poorly by doing the good of thriftiness. She argues that real
economists would not buy into the popular view that we should allow a few rich people to be
spendthrifts and thus to create jobs for the rest of the society. “The Christian and other opponents
of the sin of avarice need to stop conceding the point to [this idea] (460).” Ibid., 456-460.
43
Young; Howard J. Curzer, "Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Temperance in Nicomachean
Ethics Iii.10-11," Journal of the History of Philosophy 35, no. 1 (1997). For simplicity’s sake, I
would follow Young’s reasoning here.
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the virtue of temperance is usually brought up in the context of sexual ethics.44
Even though Curzer argues that Aristotle later moves from bodily pleasure to a
broader set of pleasures as the objects of temperance, the objects still have to be
tactile pleasures. 45 Therefore, despite its popularity, identifying greed as
profligacy or self-indulgence is inappropriate in the Aristotelian tri-relational
structure of virtues and vices.
At the end of this Section where I started discussing greed in relation to
Aristotle’s ethics, I would like to give a remark on the overall reasoning of this
paper. In criticizing others for not following Aristotle closely, I am not trying to
propose that we endorse the strictly Aristotelian analysis of greed and nothing else.
(And I will reiterate this point later in this paper.) My aim is only to develop an
integrated concept of greed that incorporates what I understand as the Aristotelian
concept of greed. Furthermore, as I will explain in Section 3.2, there are debates
among Aristotle experts over the correct interpretation of greed. While I will
present a case for the interpretation that I find more reasonable, I do not see the
reason why someone who embraces an alternative interpretation has to reject my
proposed integrated concept of greed as well. All she needs to reject is the claim
that the added component is strictly Aristotelian, which does not damage my
position in this paper.
SECTION 3: GREED AS A DEADLY SIN AND GREED AS PLEONEXIA
3.1. Greed as a Deadly Sin According to Taylor
Next, let us consider meanness, stinginess and envy, as Gabriele Taylor suggests.
A greedy person usually is mean and stingy, not willing to share her wealth. A
greedy person has a strong desire to get more and more. If she sees that someone
else has something that she does not have, she will be envious. Therefore, perhaps
greed can be grouped with one or more of these vices.
That is Taylor’s basic idea when she explicates the seven deadly sins in
the Christian tradition. In her book Deadly Vices, Taylor claims that the seven
deadly sins in the Christian tradition “were correctly so named, and correctly
classed together.” All of them, she argues, are similar in being destructive of the
self and preventing the self from flourishing. She also believes that her treatment
will offer “at least negative support for some central claims of an Aristotelian‐
type virtue‐theory.”46 In what follows, I will take her explication to be consistent
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with, and even representative of, the Christian notion of avarice in the seven
deadly sins.47
Before we examine her discussion of envy and covetousness, let us
familiarize ourselves with the ideas on which she is drawing, i.e., Aquinas’
discussion of covetousness:
I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure,
evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that
measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in
a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs
be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is
commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6).
External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as
stated above (117, 3; I-II, 02, 1). Hence it must needs be that man’s
good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words,
that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external
riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping
with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to
exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them
immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is
defined as ‘immoderate love of possessing.’ It is therefore evident
that covetousness is a sin. (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ST)
2a2ae q. 118 art. 2) (Italics mine.)
A succinct modern-day rendition of the same idea of “immoderate love of
possession” can be found in an entry of the online Catholic Encyclopedia:
Avarice (from Latin avarus, ‘greedy’; ‘to crave’) is the inordinate
love for riches. Its special malice, broadly speaking, lies in that it
makes the getting and keeping of money, possessions, and the like,
a purpose in itself to live for. It does not see that these things are
valuable only as instruments for the conduct of a rational and

47
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harmonious life, due regard being paid of course to the special
social condition in which one is placed.48
Two themes can be identified here. First, Aquinas most likely was working under
Aristotle’s tri-relational view of virtues and vices when he saw covetousness as an
“immoderate love of possession.” Second, it is all right for a person to seek
material riches. However, if that amount of riches exceeds what is “necessary for
him to live in keeping with his condition of life,” and the pursuit of which
becomes “a purpose in itself to live for,” the person has an inordinate desire for
riches, and that is covetousness.
So far, we have been discussing the notions of covetousness, avarice and
greed as if they were synonymous. However, here comes Taylor’s suggestion that
they are different:
Traditionally, covetousness, the sin of avaritia, was thought of
quite generally as the inordinate love of wealth and the power that
wealth gives (e.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ST) 2a2ae q. 118
art. 2). Such love was said to take different forms: it may manifest
itself in miserly hoarding, in lavish spending, or in the persistent
acquisition of wealth by whatever means. This suggests that there
are three paradigm cases of covetousness, personified in the
miserly avaricious, the spendthrift, and the greedy, having in
common an ‘unreasonable’ attitude towards money or material
possessions in general, but distinguishable from each other by
specific features of the respective attitudes involved.49
So, avarice is now associated with stinginess and hoarding, and the person
possessing it is a miser. The respective attitude there is about keeping, nonspending. Taylor also later expands this definition by claiming that the sin of
avaritia is not limited to excessive material possession. She loosens up the ideas
of ends and use in claiming that covetousness could be excessive possession of
something not useful, e.g., works of art or even academic research.50 Whatever
48

Joseph Delany, "Avarice," Robert Appleton Company, accessed 15 Mar, 2015.
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the object of miserly avarice may be, the respective attitude there is definitely
different from, or even opposite to, the respective attitude for spendthrift, which
would be about careless spending and throwing away of possession. Greed is not
sharply distinct from avarice, she admits. 51 However, she insists that greed is
structurally similar to envy. She identifies greed as similar to a kind of destructive
state-envy, which is a “sour grapes syndrome,” i.e. being envious of what other
people have but you don’t have, with a hostile or aggressive attitude, and you
having that thing is not going to improve your own position.52 We may note that,
following from Taylor’s discussion, the attitude for greed is now acquisitive
whereas that of miserly avarice is about not spending.
How can covetousness have three distinct forms? The only key to make
sense of this seems to be the very basic idea of inordinate love of wealth, or of
something else, which corrupts the self, where the inordination or the corruption
takes three different forms - not spending, spending carelessly and lavishly, and
acquiring more and more. However, this interpretation of Aquinas seems to have
gone beyond the Aristotelian virtues and vices, despite Aquinas’ apparent attempt
to follow Aristotle. In Book IV of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, meanness,
stinginess and envy have already had their corresponding virtues, which are
liberality, magnificence and righteous indignation respectively. These do not
seem to be suitable candidates for the corresponding virtue of greed.
Indeed, we may even wonder if the first two of the three forms of
covetousness look like greed. Or, at least, they are not greed as we usually refer to
today. As a first approximation, the characteristic feature of a greedy person is to
have the consuming desire to acquire more and more, as we have seen earlier in
this paper. We can easily think of greedy people portrayed in movies like “The
Wolf of Wall Street” spending tons of money on luxury cars and extravagant
parties and dinners. On the other hand, there may be hoarders who are not greedy
at all. For example, some hoarders keep everything that they have come to
possess since their childhood but they do not care about acquiring more of
anything else.
The third form of covetousness, which Taylor calls greed and claims to be
similar to envy in structure, pertains to persistent acquisition of wealth by
whatever means. That is certainly very close to our contemporary understanding
of greed. However, there is one possible exception. A greedy person as we
understand today does not have to be envious of what other people have but she
does not have. Imagine a person in the top 1% of the world. She probably has
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everything that many other people have in their whole lives. But she can still be
greedy in the sense of having a consuming desire to acquire more and more.
In conclusion, while Taylor has a point in identifying three forms of
inordinate love of wealth, it seems to drift away too much from our ordinary
notion of greed when she groups the three forms under one roof. There are also
two troubling issues in her view, or in Aquinas’ view. First, it still sees
covetousness as a form of intemperance (“immoderate love of possessing” or
“inordinate love for riches”), which is not what the kind of intemperance Aristotle
construes. Second, it is very hard to specify how much is necessary for one to live
in keeping with one’s condition of life. If we understand one’s condition of life
narrowly, as in mere survival situations, very little is enough to meet the
necessary level. However, certainly most people would not like to live like that,
but then there is hardly any objective basis for us to tell how much is enough. I
will re-visit this in Section 4. Now, let us turn to a radically different idea of greed.
3.2. Greed as Pleonexia
McCloskey and Taylor claim to be working within an Aristotelian framework.
However, even from a not-too-technical discussion as I presented above, we have
to wonder if they are mistaken. They would have difficulty locating greed among
the relations of vices and virtues that Aristotle has explicitly discussed. It is also
unclear why they do not connect greed with the notion of pleonexia found in
Book V of Nicomachean Ethics, which seems highly relevant.53 The only scholar
that I am aware of who is a self-proclaimed Aristotelian and taking greed as
pleonexia is Alasdair MacIntyre, whom I will discuss in Section 3.3.
For now, let us familiarize ourselves with the concept of pleonexia. In
Book V, after discussing “general” justice in the sense of being “the whole of
virtue,” Aristotle proceeds to discuss “particular” justice in relation to fairness,
honor, money and safety. There we find the concept of pleonexia. Etymologically
speaking, it means “having more,” but it is usually translated as “excessive
possessiveness,” “graspingness,” “greed,” “covetousness,” or “selfishness.”54 The
concept of pleonexia is related to particular injustice. Other translations include
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“overreaching,” “getting more than one’s fair share,” “aggrandizement,” and
“graspingness.”55Aristotle says,
Again, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes
money by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite
though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be
held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is
unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he is unjust by
reason of his making gain by his act. Again, all other unjust acts
are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness, e.g.
adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a comrade in battle to
cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a man makes gain, his
action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but injustice.
(1130a24f)
So, according to Aristotle, as a first approximation, there is something unjust
when a man commits adultery for the sake of gain, or making money out of it.
Similarly, there is injustice in the cases of making a gain by deserting a fellow
soldier or assaulting someone for the sake of gain. When we think about the
sexual pleasure involved, it seems true that the vice exhibited in the adultery case
has something to do with self-indulgence. However, Aristotle sounds like that a
single action does not exhibit more than one virtue or vice. How is it possible that
Aristotle says it is injustice but not self-indulgence? Why couldn’t it be both? And
by what principle can we tell that an action exhibits injustice instead of selfindulgence? Here Curzer offers a helpful explanation. He suggests that we must
understand Aristotle’s idea of an action to be a behavior-under-a-description.
Therefore, we may have the same behavior but there are different actions, which
exhibit different virtues. 56 And the action with the description of, roughly
speaking, making a gain exhibits injustice, which is the vice of pleonexia.
However, one may wonder, what is so wrong about making a gain?
Pleonexia may literally and simply means “having more.” It sounds like the
behavior in “making a gain” or “having more” may be virtuous or vicious
depending on further qualification. This is probably what Bernard Williams has in
mind when he claims that, “insofar as Aristotle connects injustice essentially with
55
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pleonexia, he is mistaken.” 57 According to Williams, there is a distinction
between a person who is not vicious but whose act is vicious, and a person who is
vicious and whose act is vicious. For example, Smith makes a gain by deserting
his fellow soldier out of weakness of the will, whereas Jones makes a gain by
deserting his fellow solider willfully and he has a deserting disposition in his
character. Even though both Smith and Jones display the same behavior to make a
gain, Jones should be called greedy and Smith should be called cowardly.
On the surface, that seems to make sense. To say that someone is greedy
when they behave in a certain way, we inevitably make a judgment about that
person’s motive or even psychology for that behavior. In general, simply knowing
that someone has displayed a certain behavior, without specifying the motive or
psychology for that behavior, is not sufficient to determine what kind of
wrongdoing it is, and there may even be no wrongdoing.
To address the criticism of Williams, we may need to pay attention to the
context of Aristotle’s discussion. He distinguishes universal justice and particular
justice. “Universal justice,” as Miller explicates, “includes any ethical virtue in so
far as it promotes and protects the good of the community, whereas particular
justice involves specific sorts of actions affecting the common advantage.” 58
Therefore, the key here is not just “having more,” but having more than what one
has a right to, or having more than one’s fair share, 59 in the context of one’s
community. As Curzer puts it, “[p]leonexia is a desire for certain goods not qua
good, but rather qua more than one’s share. The sphere of particular justice is
gain…”60 Sherman and Young also respectively point out that it is unfortunate
that the immediate text seems to focus on “the fact that he gains.” The correct
interpretation of Aristotle’s thought is that “it is not the desire for gain simpliciter
but rather the desire for gain in pleonectic circumstances [in which gaining
requires taking what belongs to others] that is distinctive of particular injustice.”61
Sherman states that “pleonexia is the desire to have more within a context in
which one recognizes the getting more is necessarily based upon others getting
less; the fact that other will get comparably less, however, may, but does not
necessarily, motivate this desire, though it is obviously a corollary of it.” 62 To
conclude, Williams’ criticism is unfortunately focused on the immediate context
such that he overlooks that Aristotle means pleonexia to be about gaining by way
57
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of taking what belongs to other members in one’s community. In other words, the
behavior of gaining is not enough to determine the vice in question. That behavior
should come with a description so that it is an action that displays the vice of
pleonexia.
There is one more feature of pleonexia to which we should pay attention.
Aristotle specifies that the motive behind the grasping is “the pleasure of gain.”63
With such a pleasure of gain as the motive, the person is essentially, but not
accidentally, getting more in an unfair manner. The idea of essentially but not
accidentally hurting others unfairly is crucial here. As Sherman aptly puts it,
“while we are usually forgiving of friends who act from their shortcomings to our
intermittent (and unintended) detriment, we are considerably less inclined to
forgive those whose only vice is a propensity to shortchange us for the sake of
what is ostensibly in their own rational self-interest.”64 Unlike other moral failure
such as self-indulgence in adultery which happens to also let the person make a
gain, it is only pleonexia that would invariably evince “a calculating indifference
toward one’s fellow citizens that is, in principle, incompatible with the existence
of a polis.”65 That is why, Sherman claims, Aristotle takes particular injustice so
seriously. As Judith N. Shklar puts it,
If Aristotle is to be our guide, the unjust person is no victim of any
kind. He is dominated by only one vice, greed. That is why he
breaks the rules of law and fairness. He just wants more of
everything, material goods, prestige, and power. And the impact of
his greed falls entirely upon others, who receive less than they
deserve thanks to his grasping conduct.66
After this lengthy discussion, we may now see why Williams is mistaken.
Williams postulates that a person may have gain for various reasons but the
description part of the action, to use Curzer’s terminology, has already specified
the motive and psychology for the action.
From this we learn more about the concept of pleonexia. It is misleading
to focus on the gain simpliciter as a behavior. Aristotle focuses on action, which is
a behavior-under-a-description, and the description in question is a pleonectic
circumstance in which one acquires more than one’s share by taking what belongs
63
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to one’s fellow citizens. In such acquisition, one takes pleasure in gain, and
essentially with a calculating indifference toward one’s fellow citizens. That is
greed as pleonexia.
3.3. Addressing MacIntyre’s alternative view on pleonexia
One may wonder why I did not mention MacIntyre’s view on greed earlier, since
MacIntyre qualifies as both Christian and Aristotelian. The reason is that he
explicitly discusses pleonexia, which puts him more appropriately in this section
right after I introduced greed as pleonexia.
MacIntyre is widely known as a staunch critic of liberal modernity,
including free market capitalism. His discussion of greed is located in such a
context. MacIntyre’s view can be pieced together from passages in various
works,67 but the following two passages are illustrative enough for our purpose
here:
Pleonexia is sometimes translated so as to make it appear that the
vice which it picks out is simply that of wanting more than one’s
share. This… is to diminish the gap between the ancient world and
modem individualism, for we have no problem -- how could
anyone have a problem? -- with the thought that it is wrong to take
more than one’s share. But in fact the vice picked out is that of
acquisitiveness as such, a quality that modern individualism both
in its economic activity and in the character of the consuming
aesthete does not perceive to be a vice at all.68
What such translations of “pleonexia” [that names a disposition to
engage in a type of activity of gaining more than one’s share]
conceal from us is the extent of the difference between Aristotle’s
standpoint on the virtues and vices, and more especially his
standpoint on justice and the dominant standpoint of peculiarly
modern societies. For the adherents of that standpoint recognize
that acquisitiveness is a character trait indispensable to continuous
and limitless economic growth, and one of their central beliefs is
that continuous and limitless economic growth is a fundamental
good. That a systematically lower standard of living ought to be
Beabout has provided such a reverse reconstruction of MacIntyre’s criticism. Gregory R.
Beabout, The Character of the Manager: From Office Executive to Wise Steward (New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 108.
68
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2007), 137.
67
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preferred to a systematically higher standard of living is a thought
incompatible with either the economics or the politics of peculiarly
modern societies.69
So, MacIntyre is aware of the fact that some scholars -- Hobbes, Mill, Irwin who
translated Nicomachean Ethics 70 -- render pleonexia as what I have just
introduced in the previous section. However, he rejects that translation and prefers
what I have previously labeled as the common sense notion of a consuming desire
to acquire more, without any further qualification.
MacIntyre is trying to be faithful to the overall political philosophy of
Aristotle, and he rightly points out that Aristotle would have been opposed to the
endless pursuit of economic growth or endless pursuit of higher and higher
standards of living in today’s free market capitalism. He thinks that greed, as the
acquisitive desire, is no longer regarded as a vice today. So far so good. However,
the reason MacIntyre rejects the translation of pleonexia as gaining more than
one’s share is questionable. As discussed above, if pleonexia were simply about
desires to gain more and more, the behavior of gaining more might not involve
greed. The behavior should come with a description so that it is an action that
displays greed. And that description has something to do with acquiring more
than one’s share by taking what belongs to one’s fellow citizens, taking pleasure
in such gain, and essentially with a calculating indifference toward one’s fellow
citizens. MacIntyre has presented no textual analysis to counter that.
Furthermore, why would MacIntyre reject the above understanding or
translation of pleonexia? From the first quote above, it seems the main reason is
that MacIntyre thinks nowadays people no longer see greedy behaviors as unfair,
“for we have no problem -- how could anyone have a problem? -- with the
thought that it is wrong to take more than one’s share.” Right after the second
quote above, MacIntyre continues,
prices and wages have come to be understood as unrelated—and
indeed in a modern economy could not be related—to desert in
terms of labor, and the notion of a just price or a just wage in
modern terms makes no sense. But a community which was guided
by Aristotelian norms would not only have to view acquisitiveness
as a vice but would have to set strict limits to growth as that is
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necessary to preserve or enhance a distribution of goods according
to desert.71
If people no longer think that gaining in capitalism is unfair, it seems true that
translating greed as wanting more than one’s share, instead of acquisitiveness,
will lose its contemporary relevance. However, it seems false that people do not
see gaining in capitalism as unfair. Even in today’s American capitalistic system
people still have a feeling of unfairness when they learn that some CEOs make
several hundred times more money than an average worker does. When Martin
Shkreli raised the price of Daraprim from $13.50 per tablet to $750 per tablet,
people were outraged. In 1990, economists George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen
published a paper discussing how the perception of a fair wage affects a worker’s
willingness to exert effort at work.72 We can still find papers published after 2000
that discuss this fair wage-effort hypothesis.73 A quick search for “fair price” in
the business database will show hundreds of results. Finally, there are two
recently published books discussing how much is enough.74 Having said all these,
to be as charitable as possible in interpretation, I grant that this may not be a
conclusive argument against MacIntyre’s claim that the notion of a just price or a
just wage in modern terms makes no sense. It is because he may claim to be
working from a purely theoretical standpoint, i.e., perhaps his theoretical
understanding of liberal capitalism by definition simply cannot make sense of the
notion of a just price or a just wage. It is like what he says about the
enlightenment project -- the project as he understands it just “had to fail.”75 A
charitable interpretation like this may argue that MacIntyre’s position is still not
yet completely refuted, but I would submit that what I presented above amounts to
a significant doubt on his claim. With this significant doubt, we have strong
reason to believe that the notion of a just price or a just wage in modern terms still
makes sense to us. Then there may be no more compelling reason for us to reject
71
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the translation of pleonexia as acquiring more than one’s share by taking what
belongs to one’s fellow citizens, taking pleasure in such gain, and essentially with
a calculating indifference.
To conclude, MacIntyre may be right that greed is no longer seen as a vice
now. Instead, it is “now the driving force of modern productive work.”76 Also, the
endless pursuit of economic growth does not square well with Aristotle’s political
philosophy and ethics. However, those are not strong reasons to reject pleonexia
as acquiring more than one’s share by taking what belongs to one’s fellow
citizens, taking pleasure in such gain, and essentially with a calculating
indifference. MacIntyre sometimes makes it sound like the mistake is about not
respecting a literal translation. However, he has not offered any textual analysis.
Second, contrary to what MacIntyre thinks, the notion of a just wage or just price
still makes sense today. It is unreasonable to opt for an interpretation of a term in
an ancient text simply because that interpretation fits our critique of the
contemporary situation better, ignoring the textual analysis that supports a
different interpretation. It is even more unreasonable when there is significant
doubt on the alleged reasons for such option.
3.4. Addressing Balot’s alternative view on pleonexia
Let us now look at another objection to the understanding of pleonexia that I
presented in Section 3.2. Unlike MacInytre, Ryan K. Balot is well aware of the
discussion of Curzer, Young, et. al. on pleonexia but he is not satisfied with their
textual analysis. In the end he believes that Aristotle’s pleonexia is very much like
what I have labeled as the common sense notion in this paper: “Aristotle views
greed as an excessive acquisitiveness of various divisible goods, which is driven
by the pleasures of actually getting the good in question.”77 Balot comes to his
position about pleonexia by criticizing two mistakes in Curzer’s interpretation.
First, regarding Curzer’s claim that pleonexia “is a desire for certain goods not
qua good, but rather qua more than one’s share,” 78 Balot argues that this
interpretation is “highly counterintuitive” because, according to Balot, “Aristotle
conceives the unjust agent as desiring to have more of some good, be it money,
honor, or safety.”79 The word “gain” (kerdos) to Aristotle, Balot argues, is simply
about “having more than one had previously.”80
76
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Again, the issue is about whether pleonexia is desiring gains or desiring
gains at the expense of others, as I discussed in Section 3.2 in relation to
Williams’s objection. Perhaps the immediate context allows both interpretations.
But it is noteworthy that Balot has not explicitly addressed Curzer’s reason why
he makes the distinction between behavior and action. To recap, Curzer
understands that sometimes we wonder why the same behavior can be said to
involve more than one vice, as in the case of adultery where it seems both selfindulgence and greed are involved. Curzer then explains that, to exhibits a vice or
a virtue, we need an action, i.e., behavior-under-a-description, not merely the
behavior. Therefore, the behavior of gaining more needs further qualification
from a description. This move of Curzer is more than attempting to understand the
etymology of the word “gain.” Rather, this is an interpretational attempt to make
sense of having various virtues or vices to be related to the same behavior. If
Balot would like to reject this move, he should focus on Curzer’s overall
interpretational strategy and its explanatory power of the larger context of
Aristotelian ethics instead of philology. Unfortunately, that is something Balot has
not offered.
Now, let us consider Curzer’s second “mistake.” According to Balot,
Curzer incorrectly thinks that the greedy person is aware of the fact that he is
doing something wrong. Such awareness, Balot argues, is categorically denied by
Aristotle. For this, Balot refers us to Aristotle’s discussion of incontinence and
self-indulgence, 81 where Aristotle claims that generally a vicious agent is not
aware of the fact that what she does is wrong. Therefore, Balot continues, the
greedy person “cannot conceive of himself as ‘taking more than his share,’
because that description would require him to know what an appropriate share is
and to desire to take more than that amount…”82
Why does this constitute a criticism for Curzer? As it turns out, Curzer
himself is also familiar with the Aristotelian idea that a vicious agent does not
know that what she does is wrong. When discussing incontinence, Curzer
describes that, “[t]he vicious person (kakos, phaulos, ponēros, mochthēros) is not
internally conflicted, for he or she feels, chooses, and acts wrongly.” 83 It is
unlikely then that Curzer would ignore a concept that he himself is readily aware
of. If Curzer would not make this kind of mistake, how would he address the
criticism of Balot? I think the key here rests on what exactly is the greedy person
aware of and unaware of. Perhaps the greedy person is aware of her consuming
desire for gaining more but she is unaware of the unfair and indifferent nature of
such gaining. That is a very plausible scenario. In fact, Balot thinks the same way:
81

Aristotle, 1150b36, 52a5-6.
Balot, 31.
83
Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 46-47.
82

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2015

23

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 4 [2015], Art. 10

“their violation of justice is simply an external fact of their behavior, not part of
their motivation.” 84 So, our next and last question is this: why couldn’t Balot
believe that Curzer also thinks this way? We may want to go back to how Balot
characterizes Curzer’s view. All we can find is this:
Following Hobbes to the letter, Curzer argues, ‘Pleonexia is a
desire for certain goods not qua good, but rather qua more than
one’s share.’ In other words, the greedy agent desires the illicit
pleasures of getting more than he deserves, rather than desiring to
possess an actual good, such as land or money, for its own sake.
He desires to cheat others out of what they deserve.85
After “in other words” it is all Balot’s own reading. It is unclear why Balot has to
read the sentence “Pleonexia is a desire for certain goods not qua good, but rather
qua more than one’s share” as if the greedy agent must desire to cheat others out
of what they deserve. “Qua more than one’s share” could simply be a factual
description of the nature of such gaining instead of a part of the intentional
content of the agent. And here it may be helpful to note that, as I presented in
Section 3.2, Sherman also claims that the fact that other will get comparably less
does not necessarily motivate the desire to gain.86
To conclude, the whole criticism of this second “mistake” turns out to be
based on an unsympathetic and implausible reading of Curzer. Since Balot also
has not offered any argument against the wider interpretational strategy of Curzer,
at this point I suggest there is no compelling reason to accept Balot’s view.
From now on I would accept the view of pleonexia I presented in Section
3.2 based on Curzer, Irwin, Miller, Sherman and Young, among others, as the
Aristotelian view. Readers who disagree may see this as just a matter of
convenience and respect for its source. If my conclusion turns out to be inaccurate,
we may easily make a harmless adjustment in nomenclature.87
Balot, 32. Few pages before he criticizes Curzer, Balot explains that Aristotle’s greed is “both
an internal attribute of an individual, and, paradoxically, an external feature of a distributive
situation: it is at once a disposition to get more and the condition of unfairness in the distribution
of good.” Ibid., 27.
85
Ibid., 29.
84

“[P]leonexia is the desire to have more within a context in which one recognizes the
getting more is necessarily based upon others getting less; the fact that other will get
comparably less, however, may, but does not necessarily, motivate this desire, though it
is obviously a corollary of it.” Sherman, 243.
87
I would like to further clarify this claim. I am quite confident that the arguments on the
interpretation of pleonexia presented in Sections 3.2-3.4 are cogent. However, to appease
any possible worry by philologists or classicists who would like to go much deeper into
86
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SECTION 4: GREED AND ITS RELEVANCE TODAY
4.1. Motivating an Integrated Concept of Greed
Having discussed the interpretational issues about pleonexia, I would like to make
it clear that I am not proposing that we all become followers of Aristotle and think
of greed as pleonexia. I propose instead that our common sense understanding of
greed and the Christian understanding of greed may need the complement of
greed as pleonexia. Unlike the popular belief that greed is a consuming desire to
acquire more and more (G1), or the Christian belief that greed is an inordinate
love of wealth (G2), Aristotle’s pleonexia instead is concerned about acquiring
more than one’s share by taking what belongs to one’s fellow citizens, taking
pleasure in such gain, and acting essentially with a calculating indifference toward
one’s fellow citizens (G3). It is baffling why Christian authors likes McCloskey
and Taylor who try to work out an Aristotelian understanding do not seem to be
aware of Aristotle’s discussion of pleonexia at all. Upon investigation, we found
that their so-called Aristotelian adherence is nothing more than taking greed as
some kind of imbalance of desires to acquire more and more, beyond what is
necessary for one’s living. That is why ultimately McCloskey would like to
construe greed as intemperance, and why Taylor takes the three radically different
forms of “covetousness” to share a very similar structure, i.e., all three are about
some kind of inordinate love of wealth. This kind of Christian appropriation of
Aristotle’s ethics, together with the lack of awareness of the distinctive nature of
pleonexia, is hardly Aristotelian. MacIntyre, on the other hand, has deeper

the language and texts, readers of this paper should be reminded that the purpose of this
paper is not about finding out the exact meaning of Aristotle’s thought with the utmost
precision. And it will be clear in the next section that I have no intention to suggest that
we must follow Aristotle strictly and completely, whatever his view is. I chided
McCloskey and Taylor for not being Aristotelian enough simply because they fail to do
what they claim to do, not because I am a staunch Aristotelian who cannot tolerate any
unorthodox interpretation of the ancient texts. Therefore, ultimately whether Balot or
MacIntyre is right on this issue or not is not going to cause much damage to the position
of this paper, which is that the idea of greed as gaining more than one’s share (roughly
speaking) can help us speak about greed, and we need to integrate this idea to other ideas
about greed in order to have a better understanding of greed so that it is relevant and
useful in the contemporary business world. So, hypothetically speaking, if Balot or
MacIntyre were right, all I needed to do is to stop calling the understanding of pleonexia,
presented in Section 3.2, as Aristotelian. However, I can still use that understanding of
pleonexia to construct my integrated concept of greed in the next section.
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understanding of Aristotle but, in my opinion, he mistakenly refuses to accept the
more orthodox interpretation of pleonexia.
In Section 4.2, I will discuss how the Aristotelian notion of pleonexia may
help in our understanding of greed by integrating G1, G2 and G3 together.
However, before I discuss how to integrate G1, G2 and G3, I would like to make a
methodological and linguistic remark. Throughout this paper, I have been taking
for granted that there are many competent linguistic users in today’s world who
use the word “greed” or “greedy” without apparent difficulty. That strongly
suggests the idea of greed is still alive in our language and it is thought to be
relevant and useful in our society. However, that does not imply that the use or
meaning of the word is clear, coherent and accurate. If it is not clear, coherent or
accurate, the word “greed” or “greedy” indeed sounds irrelevant.
As I will argue in the next section, without integrating G3 as part of the
concept of greed, this consequence of irrelevance is hard to avoid. That is why I
propose an integrated concept of greed. However, it is possible that someone
would claim, “I don’t feel like greed has any sense whatsoever as G3 suggests. If
G1 and G2 are going to be less relevant today, so be it.” 88 When it comes to
intuition in philosophical debates, it is like a stand-off and hardly any side can
completely convince the other. However, I would invite the readers to consider
why there are people who express G3 in their discourses on greed. Perhaps
understanding their reasoning as coherent and relevant would help you appreciate
their linguistic intuition. A quick search in academic and popular literature may
give us some thoughts. For example, Beth Miller draws on three recent studies
and argues on the website Science Daily that people may have gut feeling about
their CEOs being too greedy. 89 Stephanie Pappas wrote on Live Science that
countries using most of the resources on Earth are greedy. 90 Actor Leonardo
DiCaprio spoke on the World Economic Forum that oil companies are greedy and
destroying the planet.91 Professor Keld Jensen, in analyzing the US-China trade

88

I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer who expressed this very different
linguistic intuition of greed such that I am more aware of the need to address various
linguistic intuitions.
89
Beth Miller, "Corporate Greed: That Gut Feeling You Have About Your Ceo Is Spot
On," Science Daily, accessed August 3, 2019.
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/05/150515083230.htm.
90
Stephanie Pappas, "Gredy Nations: Top (and Bottom) Resources Users on Earth," Live
Science, accessed August 3, 2019. https://www.livescience.com/20308-greedy-nationstop-resource-users-earth.html.
91
Lana Clements, "Leonardo Dicaprio Blasts Greedy Oil Companies: "Enough Is
Enough"," Daily and Sunady Express, accessed August 3, 2019.
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tension, argues that China, America’s greatest competitor, in fact is created by
American greed.92 Finally, in a paper in Italian Studies in Southern Africa, Poeti
Alida argues that exploitative societies are governed by greed and they are
pushing the planet on the verge of ecological disaster.93 All these claims connect
greed with injustice, which G3 can best explicate. In other words, they are
referring to activities of unjustly taking what belongs to one’s fellow global
citizens, taking pleasure in such gain, and acting essentially with a calculating
indifference toward the one’s fellow global citizens. And that kind of activities
are not usually unlawful.94 The moral mistake there is not merely about having a
consuming desire to take more, or some sort of imbalance in regulating one’s
desires, but also injustice in distributing global resources, as if a country is
gaining what should have been shared by other countries, with a calculating
indifference. This linguistic practice is ubiquitous, especially when it comes to the
distribution of limited global resources.95 People from poorer countries, and those
who sympathize with them, are all too familiar with this kind of claim about
greed.96
4.2. An Integrated Concept of Greed

https://www.express.co.uk/finance/city/636747/Leonardo-DiCaprio-greedy-oilcompanies-davos-enough.
92
Keld Jensen, "American Greed Created America's Greatest Competitor," Forbes,
accessed August 3, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/keldjensen/2018/04/03/americangreed-have-created-americas-greatest-competitor/
93
Poeti Alida, "Visione Satirica E Paradossale Del Terzo Millennio Ne L'apocalisse
Rimandata Ovvero Benvenuta Catastrofe Di Dario Fo," Italian Studies in Southern Africa
27, no. 2 (2014).
94
Since greedy actions under G3 are not usually unlawful, greed is not reduced to theft. I
would like to thank an anonymous reviewer who raised this concern so that now I state it
more clearly.
95
And it is also not uncommon in topics unrelated the distribution of limited global
resources, as my discussion of the examples of Pastor Jill and King David in the Christian
Bible in the next section shows.
96
Again, this discussion may not be enough to convince those with a different linguistic
and philosophical intuition. Those who do not share the linguistic intuition about G3 may
protest against others’ inclusion of G3 in the concept of greed. They refuse to call the
aforementioned cases to be examples of greed and chide those who do as inferior
linguistic users. However, I would like to point out that the other side may instead protest
against the exclusion of G3 in the concept of greed and give a similar chiding remark.
That is the kind of stand-off that I mentioned. Anyway, I believe I have given good
reason for us to take G3 seriously.
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Now, I would like to submit the concept of pleonexia as a useful and relevant
insight into our contemporary understanding of greed. We need an integrated
concept of greed. G3 has its own shortcomings viewed from a contemporary
perspective. Our understanding of today’s political economic life is radically
different from that of Aristotle. Even if we may also be critical about the endless
pursuit of economic growth, I am afraid most readers would not be as opposed to
usury as Aristotle is. He believes that gaining from money itself but not from
nature is most hated (1258b). Furthermore, G3 does not say anything about a
consuming desire, which seems inadequate and awkward from a contemporary
perspective. Therefore, I suggest we formulate an appropriate concept of greed
instead of following any particular one that is described above. When we compare
and contrast G1, G2 and G3, we will find that there are different emphases. G1
emphasizes the psychological aspect of a greedy person. It claims that a greedy
person has a consuming desire for more and more. Such a desire renders the
person restless until it is satisfied. G2, on the other hand, emphasizes the
metaphysical aspect of a greedy person. It claims that there is something wrong in
the person’s understanding of human nature in relation to the priority of desires
and needs. G3, interestingly, emphasizes the social aspect of a greedy person in
terms of justice in society. It understands the person in question as a member of a
community, and such social relation is specific to a particular cultural historical
time and space.
How are we going to integrate them? First, we need to understand their
individual issues. I have just claimed that G3 has its own social political
assumptions but it lacks the psychological aspect. What about G1 and G2? Well,
G1 does capture much of what we usually mean by greed, but it could be too
vague to help determine whether a certain person or a certain action is greedy. For
example, we may not want to call the breadwinner in a household who has a
consuming desire to have more money to provide for the family a greedy person.
G1 , which stresses a desire to acquire more and more but it does not have the
qualification of whether the desire exceeds one’s need or one’s share, does not
provide any explanation as why exactly having a consuming desire to get more
and more is bad or wrong.
Let us turn to the Christian position G2, as interpreted by Taylor. G2 claims
that a person is greedy when that person has developed an inordinate love of
wealth, when the amount one desires for is more than what is necessary “for [one]
to live in keeping with [one’s] condition of life”, and when the love of wealth has
become destructive of the self and prevents the self from flourishing. We may
wonder whether we should follow Taylor in thinking that a scholar is greedy in
devoting her life to more and more publications. Or, in the same token, is an artist
greedy in devoting her life to more and more artistic creation? After all, what is
the right kind of balance or priority regarding all the desires in one’s life? It is a
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question to which nobody can give a definite answer. Thus, people in a
contemporary pluralistic world would find it hard to come to a consensus whether
a particular person is greedy or not.
Let me spell out the issue in greater detail. It is true that the Christian
position G2 gives us a little more content than “a consuming desire to acquire
more and more.” G2 is primarily focused on the moral agent’s relation to her
human nature and ends. She, as a person, has various desires. In her moral growth
as a person, and as a Christian, she has to learn to control those desires in herself
so that her life could be commensurate with its ends, which in Christianity would
be something like God’s plans and God’s purposes in her life.97 Though the desire
to acquire more and more is consuming, she has to control herself such that she
would not become obsessed with acquisition and possession, to such an extent
that the pursuit of the religious ends of her life is impaired or even frustrated.
Understood as such, greed has been the same through the centuries, since human
nature is the same through the centuries. Religious doctrines are by and large the
same as well. However, religious aspiration and devotion may be expressed in
slightly different forms depending on the stage of human civilization that you find
yourself in, what people you are living with, and what laws and customary
practices your society operates on, etc.
The above explication is couched in Christian theological language, and it
comes with a significant exception –it is perfectly alright, and even praiseworthy,
for a person to have a consuming desire to love God, or be close to God, or to be
like God, more and more. Is it possible to make G2 sensible to non-Christians in
our pluralistic society? We might be able to generalize it, as follows. All human
persons are broadly speaking similar in their natural desires, needs and limitations.
For example, nobody’s physiology would allow her to love to eat rotten eggs.
Nobody can consume ten pounds of delicious steak in one dinner, no matter how
great your appetite is. And there is so much jewelry one could put on one’s body
at the same time. Studies show that, in the US, after making an annual income of
$75K, a person no longer experience any increase in day-to-day emotional wellbeing, but having more money still improves one’s evaluation of life. 98 From
clues like these, perhaps we may have a sense of how much is enough or
necessary in a general way. However, this is not going to give us much comfort,
for it is going to be very broad and unspecific. For example, is getting another
97

Philosopher and Catholic theologian Philip L. Quinn argued that a Christian life is meaningful
only when that life narrative is aligned with the Christian narratives of salvation history about
God’s purposes both for individual humans and for humanity as a whole. Philip L. Quinn, "The
Meaning of Life According to Christianity," in The Meaning of Life: A Reader, ed. E.D. Klemke
and Steven M. Cahn (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008).
98
Kahneman and Deaton.
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master degree too much for a person? Is it greedy to have three TVs at home in
the US? If someone devotes her whole life to a religion or academic career or
making money in business such that she is not interested in getting married and
having kids at all, is she in some sense out of balance in life and not making
progress to the proper ends of human nature?
This is what we may call the indeterminacy problem, which plagues both
G1 and G2. G1 and G2 together give us a moral teaching that “to be greedy is to
seek more and more such that it’s more than what you need.” However, what one
needs is itself so indeterminate that a moral teaching like that becomes empty. Is
there really a right amount of wealth, material possession or achievement for
human flourishing? We may have to break this question down into two aspects.
First, there may not be a right amount of wealth, material possession or
achievement for a person, even when we can take into consideration everything
particular about that person, like the upbringing, standard of living of the region
where the person lives in, the stage of life, particular needs of the person’s family,
etc. Second, even if we may determine the right amount of wealth, material
possession or achievement for a particular person, this is far from we being able
to determine the right amount for everybody in the same society. Incidentally, at
the time of writing, the news website CNBC posted a story. Its title is telling
enough: “Here’s a budget breakdown of a couple that makes $500,000 a year and
still feels average.” That is about the expenses of a couple living in New York
City. They are both lawyers, and they have two young children. To them,
$500,000 is just average.99
Apart from the indeterminacy problem, there is another problem in relying
on G1 and G2 alone, which is the lack of a sense of injustice. Let us consider the
following two cases. First, consider Jill, a pastor of a large church.100 Among the
various ministries offered by her church, there is a small ministry for minorities,
which some members think is not a core mission of their church. For some
99

Kathleen Elkins, "Here's a Budget Breakdown of a Couple That Makes $500,000 a Year and
Still Feels Average", posted Mar 12, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/06/budget-breakdownof-a-couple-that-makes-500000-a-year-but-cant-save.html. More serious attempts on how much is
enough can be found in two recent books, and those two books seem to be working on a Catholic
social vision, broadly construed. Skidelsky and Skidelsky; Cloutier. Authors of both books
eventually have to admit that they are not proposing anything specific. Skidelsky and Skidelsky
would rather focus more on the critique of the endless pursuit of economic growth and its
mismatch with good life (page 218). They claim at the end that they do not try to “develop a
collective vision of the good life.” Cloutier’s overall argument is more on rejecting the idea that
“because the standards can shift somewhat over time, they are completely illusory” (page 223,
italics his). They would rather like to see their effort to be “aids for prudential judgment, not
absolutes” (page 244).
100
This is a case that I have heard about. Some details have been altered to maintain anonymity.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jrbe/vol4/iss1/10

30

Cheung: Greed, a Forgotten Vice?

reasons, those minority people have to meet, and they meet a lot, in a churchowned house on the premise of the church. Jill has been given housing allowance
by the church to rent or buy a living place for herself but she has her eyes fixed on
the aforementioned house. She eventually finds a way in church politics to stifle
the minority ministry and take over the house as her own residence, to the
detriment of that minority community.
This is like a case in the Old Testament of the Christian Bible. To rebuke
King David, who took the wife of a man in his kingdom and killed that man,
Prophet Nathan told a story of a rich man being unwilling to sacrifice any of his
own sheep and cattle to provide a feast to a guest. Instead, the rich man would
rather take the only lamb of a poor neighbor, who loves his lamb very much, to
make the meal (2 Samuel, chapter 12).
What can we make of cases like these? There may not be any clear pattern
of behaviors that shows they want more and more, and they may not have a
consuming desire to do what they do. What is more distinctive there is an
outrageous indifference attitude manifested in the actions of taking what belong to
others. Incidentally, biblical scholar David Janzen claims that in the taking of the
lamb the rich man is greedy. His reason is that the rich man and King David
already have more than what they need but they still would like to get more from
others. Interestingly, even though there is a textual clue suggesting that such
“taking” is in fact “stealing,” Janzen only focuses on greed and power abuse, not
theft.101 Pastor Jill’s case is clearer on this. In the way she rearranges the church
resources and ministries through church politics we can imagine scenarios in
which there is theft or other legal offense. That is all about greed in the sense of
injustice and calculating indifference to gain through the system.
Whereas G1 and G2 can explain the vicious desire to get from others when
one has enough for oneself, G1 and G2 do not fully capture the injustice and moral
mistake of calculating indifference to gain through the system. It could be argued
that an explanation from G2 still touches on that injustice idea by claiming that the
person’s love for wealth is so out of proportion that the person would compromise
some other moral value. However, it does not specify that the value being
compromised is justice or due respect toward others. It is here that we find G3,
Aristotle’s pleonexia, helpful and indispensable. By combining G1, G2 and G3, we
may have a fuller understanding of greed even in the cases of Pastor Jill and the
rich man who takes the lamb from his neighbor. Therefore, we may formulate the
following concept of greed:

101

David Janzen, "The Condemnation of David's "Taking" in 2 Samuel 12:1-14," Journal of
Biblical Literature 131, no. 2 (2012): 219. Again, I would like to remind the readers that G 3 does
not necessarily involve stealing.
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A person is greedy if and only if she frequently displays the
following: (1) she seeks to acquire more, (2) such acquisition is at
the expense of the interests of other people, whether she is aware
of this or not, (3) she takes pleasure in such acquisition, and (4) she
performs the acquisitive action with essentially a calculating
indifference toward other people, (5) that acquisitive action is
fueled by a consuming desire to acquire more and more, and (6)
there is a very broad sense of inordinate love of wealth but that is
going to depend on various people’s subjective understanding of
how much is enough, for which we cannot expect much consensus.
(1)-(4) together are more significant in determining whether the
person is greedy, and (5) and (6) are less significant.
In a nutshell, G3 complements G1 and G2 well. G1 is psychological but
unfortunately ahistorical and asocial. It also does not explain what is wrong with
greed. G2 points out some kind of bad priority in one’s values, which explains to
some extent what is wrong, but it is too difficult to specify a correct priority of
values that is applicable throughout the society or across cultures and religions.
G3 on the other hand is social and historical. It connects the moral wrongdoing in
greed to injustice in the particular social system one finds oneself in. It is best to
have an integrated concept of greed from all three of these. I believe this
integrated concept of greed is by far the most concrete and appropriate one that
both captures and illuminates our contemporary idea of greed.102
4.2. How Does Greed Make Sense in Today’s Business World?
By now I hope readers have also realized that the greed of Pastor Jill in fact is
very similar to the greed that is usually attributed to people in capitalism
nowadays. Regarding that kind of greed, there is certainly a consuming desire to
acquire more, and such desire seems to outweigh many other considerations in a
person’s life. However, we should not overlook the more essential and specific
moral mistake there, which is that the gain for oneself is done through some sort
of unjust means and calculating indifference toward fellow people in the same
society. Such unjust means may or may not be illegal, but it definitely engenders
moral resentment because others are thus unfairly treated. Recall Martin Shkreli
mentioned in the beginning of this paper. It is not illegal for him to raise the price
of Daraprim more than 50 times within months. However, that exudes a strong
sense of injustice and calculating indifference toward others, which is why people
102

In emphasizing that this formulation both captures and illuminates our idea of greed, I am
following the approach of reflective equilibrium, which I explained in Section 1.
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found it outrageous and called him greedy. This moral resentment does not have
to imply a rejection of capitalism.
It is illustrating to see how G1, G2 and G3 bear on the issue of CEO
compensation today. First, let us familiarize ourselves with the statistics. Quoting
Murphy , Bebchuk and Fried state that
Between 1992 and 2000, the average real (inflation-adjusted) pay
of chief executive officers (CEOs) of S&P 500 firms more than
quadrupled, climbing from $3.5 million to $14.7 million. Increases
in option-based compensation accounted for the lion’s share of the
gains, with the value of stock options granted to CEOs jumping
ninefold during this period. The growth of executive compensation
far outstripped that of compensation for other employees. In 1999,
the average large-company CEOs received approximately 140
times the pay of an average worker; in 2003, the ratio was about
500:1.103
Equilar, a company that provides executive compensation benchmarking and
tracking tools, shows on its website that, in 2015, the median CEO pay in the US
is about $15 million, whereas in the non-US countries it is about $5.5 million. In
France, for example, it is $4 million and in Japan less than $2 million.104
As Bebchuk and Fried suggest, there are different types of criticisms.
Some critics think it is not fair and morally obscene that a CEO can make so
much more money. Bebchuk and Fried label it the “populist” approach, which I
think is unfortunate. Bebchuk and Fried prefer a different approach. They have no
problem with the large amount of CEO compensation, or even when it is larger
than what it is now. They are more concerned that CEO compensation is not
determined accurately. In the whole book they argue that the determination of
CEO compensation is hardly independent of the CEOs’ influence and usually not
in the best interest of the shareholders.105
Where does that leave us who may be concerned about greed? First,
people may think you are a populist. You are unable to offer good reasons to
criticize the phenomenon but you collectively force your judgment on others
103

Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Compensation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1.
104
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anyway. Second, if there is something wrong about CEO compensation in the US,
it is wrong only in the sense that the compensation is not determined
independently and not with the shareholders’ interests in mind which is a
violation of the fiduciary obligation of the CEOs.
I would like to submit that this kind of greed-suppressing discourse is
partly due to the popularity of G1 and G2 in the understanding of greed. G1
suggests that the CEOs are greedy when they have consuming desires to have
more and more. However, if that is so, virtually everybody in society is guilty of
greed. G2 suggests that a CEO is greedy when there is some sort of imbalance of
desires such that the CEO is obsessed with acquisition of wealth beyond what is
necessary to lead a decent life in the US. Again, if that is so, virtually an
overwhelming majority of Americans are guilty of greed because they can live
with a lot less material possession. When so many people, CEOs or not, are guilty,
it sounds to the popular mind that it is not wrong at all. Moreover, in the popular
mind, most likely there is the justification that greed is the driving force of
capitalism, which means that, in the case of CEO compensation, letting the CEOs
grasp more and more is simply letting the free market mechanism in capitalism do
its work. Therefore, in the popular mind it is the accuser who is wrong. This
seems to be why and how so many people leave greed out of their ethical
evaluation of capitalism today.
The indeterminacy problem of G1 and G2 plagues when a CEO would like
to reflect on whether she is greedy or not regarding the compensation, she will
have a hard time determining it. Is she greedy solely on the basis of the sheer
amount of monetary value of the compensation that she receives as compared to
the income of an average worker? Is she greedy solely on the basis that she has
strong desires to perform better and compete with other companies in the same
industry? Even if some scholars can translate the Christian version of “enough”
into a set of non-religious generic social indicators that are sensitive to the
specific details of the society like standard of living, median income, access to
healthcare, etc., the CEOs are certainly not a typical kind of workers. Those
generic indicators may not apply well to them, and the CEOs probably will
exceed by a lot in every indicator.
Still another problem of the popularity of G1 and G2 in the understanding
of greed is, how are we going to make sense of the differences of CEO
compensations across countries? Why are American CEOs paid so much more,
whether or not we make adjustment with regard to the living costs?106 There is a
related concern when we think from the global perspective. Suppose you live in
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the US, you don’t think you are greedy, but you feel that the American CEOs are
greedy. Let us compare you with people from less wealthy countries. They may
see all the American people, including you, to be greedy. The logic is similar. In
the former case, you feel like you and those CEOs are living in the same society
and it is wrong that they can make so much more than you do such that a lot of
social resources go to them but not you. In the latter case, people from less
wealthy countries feel that because they and the American people are living in the
same globe, it is wrong that the American people can make so much more money
and American people acquire so many more global resources than they can.
It should be clear by now that there is relativity here. I would like to
suggest that the key to understanding the relativity is justice, as suggested in G3,
and this again suggests we need an integrated concept of greed. Different people
in the same society, or people in different societies, see justice in different lights.
Therefore, when the American CEOs are having consuming desires to get more
and more compensation at the expense of the interests of others, people who see
no injustice here think that the CEOs are not greedy. However, those who see
injustice here think that the CEOs are greedy. The notion of justice is complicated.
It may pertain to the degree of tolerance of unequal distribution of resources in
society. It may pertain to political and economic power abuse within the
international community. It may also pertain to various ethical theories which
give different visions of a just society. On my previous point about a just society,
it happens that philosopher Michael J. Sandel names his book on moral theories
Justice, and it begins with stories in the contemporary business world such as
CEO compensation and greed. He also sees that many socio-economic ethical
issues come down to how we understand justice, or when a society is just.107
Though economic justice is an interesting and highly relevant topic to
CEO compensation, I am afraid I will not venture into a discussion of various
theories of justice here, which goes beyond the scope of this paper on greed. What
I tried to illustrate in this Section with the example of CEO compensation is that
we need my proposed integrated concept of greed in order to understand better the
ethical concerns about CEO compensation which is usually and unfortunately
dismissed as populist.
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
Concerned about the lack of discussion on greed in the business ethics literature,
in this paper I started from the popular idea that greedy people have consuming
desires to acquire more and more, and I compared it to the Christian idea of
107
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avarice in the seven deadly sins. Some Christian authors who write on greed claim
to be following Aristotle. However, they do not include any discussion of
pleonexia. I examined the meaning of pleonexia and found it very useful in
expanding and enriching our understanding of greed in the contemporary world. I
also discussed some interpretational issues on how to understand Aristotle’s
pleonexia. Finally, I proposed an integrated concept of greed that combines the
strengths of the ideas above. I explained how this may give us an enriched
understanding of greed and I illustrated that with the example of greed in CEO
compensation.
As I stated early on, the aim and scope of this paper is a humble one,
namely to propose an integrated concept of greed that is relevant and useful in the
contemporary world in which business and capitalism are ubiquitous. I remain
non-committal on issues like whether greed is a necessary driving force of
capitalism.108 I hope this paper serves as the starting point of research projects like
greed and justice in a global context, the difference between greed and pursuit of
self-interests, sustainability as a new virtue as related to the vice of greed, etc.
Section 6: Appendix
Many popular textbooks on business ethics contain one or two chapters on ethical
theories. In their discussions of virtue ethics, the authors need to discuss some
virtues and vices. Let us see whether they mention greed.
First, there are popular textbooks that do not mention greed or something
similar to greed at all. In Business Ethics, Wicks, Freeman, Werhane and Martin
say “[v]irtues, such as prudence, fairness, trustworthiness, and courage, are forms
of human excellence that we embody after years of effort and training (even
though developing certain virtues may be naturally easier for some people than
others).” “A central aspect of good character is integrity. Literally, integrity
means wholeness: It is the sense that you have a clear conscience and can affirm
who you are and defend what you have done.”109 In Business Ethics, DeGeorge
mentions giving to charity, honesty and the Aristotelian means in case of passions
108
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and appetites.110 In Ethical Theory and Business, Arnold, Beauchamp and Bowie
briefly mention Aristotle’s general view and then give an example about a tire
salesperson who is supposed to care about service to people and providing a better
environment in the office. “The practice of business is morally better if it is
sustained by persons whose character manifests enthusiasm, truthfulness,
compassion, respectfulness, and patience.”111
Other textbooks that do not mention greed or something similar to that are:
1. Allhoff and Vaidya, Business in Ethical Focus: It is an anthology. There is
an article titled “Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and the Recommendations of
Morality.”112
2. Boatright, Ethics and the Conduct of Business: There is an example of
honesty and then the author mentions benevolence, compassion, courage,
courtesy, dependability, friendliness, honesty, loyalty, moderation, selfcontrol, and toleration.113
3. Buchholz and Rosenthal, Business Ethics: After a discussion of pluralistic
view on which virtues are central, they list the Aristotelian virtues, which
is taken from : courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, pride, good
temper, friendliness, truthfulness, wittiness, shame, justice.114
4. Hartman, Business Ethics: “Virtues can be understood as those character
traits that would constitute a good and meaningful human life. Being
friendly and cheerful, having integrity, being honest, forthright and
truthful, having modest wants, and being tolerant are some of the
characteristics of a good and meaningful human life.” And there is a
discussion that self-interest does not have to be bad, depending on what
the self-interests are. 115
There are some textbooks that mention something similar to greed or
selfishness. However, they do not make it a major vice. Donaldson and Werhane,
in Ethical Issues in Business, include an article by Solomon on the Aristotelian
approach to business ethics. They also say briefly that Aristotle points out that
110 Richard T. DeGeorge, Business Ethics, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2010), 8284.
111 Denis G. Arnold, Tom L. Beauchamp, and Norman E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business,
9th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2013), 31.
112 Fritz Allhoff and Anand J. Vaidya, Business in Ethical Focus: An Anthology (Peterborough,
ON, Canada: Broadview, 2008).
113 John R. Boatright, Ethics and the Conduct of Business, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson, 2012), 58-59.
114 Rogene Buchholz and Sandra Rosenthal, Business Ethics: The Pragmatic Path Beyond
Principles to Process (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1998), 39-40.
115 Laura P. Hartman, Business Ethics: Decision-Making for Personal Integrity & Social
Responsibility, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 123, 125.
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trading for profit is “wholly devoid of virtue and called those who engaged in
such purely selfish practices ‘parasites.’” 116 Joseph DesJardins also talks about
selfishness and greed. In An Introduction to Business Ethics, he says “[v]irtues
such as modesty, moderation, self-control, unselfishness, and humility come to
mind when we think about a CEO who could, but does not, take an excessive
salary. Self-indulgence, greed, callousness, competitiveness, and selfishness come
to mind about the others.”117
DesJardins and McCall include in Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics
only a Box 2.1 to give a brief description of virtues and ethics, where they say
“[w]e commonly speak of honest, courageous, loyal, trustworthy people.
Likewise, we are all familiar with arrogant, selfish, self-righteous, envious people.”
Then they mention the usual Aristotelian virtues and vices, and Christian virtues.
Interestingly, they also give, in passing, the list of virtues of the Boy Scouts: “A
scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, kind, courteous, obedient, thrifty,
brave, clean, and reverent.”118 This is the only textbook that has mentioned thrift
in the section on virtue ethics.
Velasquez is probably the one who discusses greed most, relatively
speaking, in textbooks. In Business Ethics, he devotes a whole page on Boesky
and he endorses the description of Boesky as “greedy,” “sick,” “aggressive,”
“fiendish,” and “ruthless.” These serve as Velasquez’s primary examples of vices.
However, what follows is a typical and brief discussion of Aristotle’s list of
virtues, in which there is no clear connection to the vice of greed. It is awkward
that greed is the vice that starts the section on virtue ethics but the discussion
there does not address greed.119
By the way, there are textbooks without explicit discussion of virtue ethics
at all, let alone greed:
1. Shaw and Barry, Moral Issues in Business120
2. Hoffman, Frederick and Schwartz, Business Ethics121
Disclaimer: There may be passages or collected articles that touch on issues very
similar to greed. I have not gone through every page. Yet it should not bother us,
116 Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H. Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical
Approach, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2008), 73-74.
117 Joseph DesJardins, An Introduction to Business Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill,
2009), 39.
118 DesJardins and McCall, 25.
119 Manuel Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson, 2012). 127, 129.
120 William H. Shaw and Vincent Barry, Moral Issues in Business, 11th ed. (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2010).
121 W. Michael Hoffman, Robert E. Frederick, and Mark S. Schwartz, Business Ethics: Readings
and Cases in Corporate Moraity, 4th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2001).
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because the point to make here is that greed is not taken seriously even when it
comes to an explicit discussion of virtue ethics. It remains awkward that there
may be textbooks that discuss greed in various passages regarding specific
business ethics issues but do not take it seriously at all in its chapter on
philosophical ethics.
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